A précis of philosophy of computing and information technology

The authors recently finished a comprehensive chapter on “Philosophy of Computing and Information Technology” for the forthcoming (fall 2009) Philosophy of Technology and Engineering Sciences (Ed.: A. Meijers), Volume IX in the Elsevier series Handbook of the Philosophy of Science (Eds.: D. Gabbay, P. Thagard and J. Woods). The purpose of the chapter is to review and discuss the main developments, concepts, topics, and contributors in the intersection between philosophy and computing, as well as provide some suggestions on how to structure the many subcategories within what is loosely referred to as philosophy of computing. In this short synopsis, we will give an outline of the kinds of issues raised in this chapter

The neglect of reason : a plea for rationalist accounts of the effects of virtual violence

The purpose of this paper is to discuss how experiencing virtual violence might lead to changes in our moral judgments through a process of rational deliberation. This perspective is proposed as a complementary alternative to the dominant tendency in current research to exclusively focus on how virtual violence affects our emotions as behavioural dispositions. I will propose and consider a rationalist, descriptive account that is based on sound principles for case-based reasoning. The controversial notion of ‘virtual rape’ will be used as an example of how the rationalist and emotivist accounts ask fundamentally different questions and how the proposed account can yield an increased understanding of how experiences in virtual worlds can change our moral judgments. This approach can, in turn, yield increased understanding of how games and virtual worlds ought to be designed in order to foster rational deliberation. The ultimate aim of this paper is to make a plea for increased focus on rational deliberation in virtual world research, which calls for increased interdisciplinarity and active collaboration towards a more nuanced and constructive debate

Continuities and discontinuities between humans, intelligent machines, and other entities

When it comes to the question of what kind of moral claim an intelligent or autonomous machine might have, one way to answer this is by way of comparison with humans: Is there a fundamental difference between humans and other entities? If so, on what basis, and what are the implications for science and ethics? This question is inherently imprecise, however, because it presupposes that we can readily determine what it means for two types of entities to be sufficiently different—what I will refer to as being “discontinuous”. In this paper, I will sketch a formal characterization of what it means for types of entities to be unique with regard to each other. This expands upon Bruce Mazlish’s initial formulation of what he terms a continuity between humans and machines, Alan Turing’s epistemological approach to the question of machine intelligence, and Sigmund Freud’s notion of scientific revolutions dealing blows to the self-esteem of mankind. I will discuss on what basis we should regard entities as (dis-)continuous, the corresponding moral and scientific implications, as well as an important difference between what I term downgrading and upgrading continuities—a dramatic difference in how two previously discontinuous types of entities might become continuous. All of this will be phrased in terms of which scientific levels of explanation we need to presuppose, in principle or in practice, when we seek to explain a given type of entity. The ultimate purpose is to provide a framework that defines which questions we need to ask if we argue that two types of entities ought (not) to be explained (hence treated) in the same manner, as well as what it takes to reconsider scientific and ethical hierarchies imposed on the natural and artificial worl

Global freedom of expression within nontextual frameworks

e increasing use of frameworks within which Internet users can contribute nontextual information constitutes a serious obstacle to government attempts to accurately censor and monitor Internet traffic. This development, as seen in the explosive growth of frameworks such as Second Life, YouTube, and Wikipedia, could lead to a transfer of regulatory power away from heavily regulated Internet Service Providers in nondemocratic regimes, into the hands of intermediaries that are more likely to uphold freedom of expression. Thereby, a development toward increasingly enframed and nontextual information can promote freedom of expression even in traditionally nondemocratic regimes. I analyze this development with regard to its possible implications for freedom of expression, online crime, and the role of private companies in international politics

Virtual worlds and their challenge to philosophy: understanding the 'intravirtual' and the 'extravirtual'

The Web, in particular real-time interactions in three-dimensional virtual environments (virtual worlds), comes with a set of unique characteristics that leave our traditional frameworks inapplicable. The present article illustrates this by arguing that the notion of “technology relations,” as put forward by Ihde and Verbeek, becomes inapplicable when it comes to the Internet, and this inapplicability shows why these phenomena require new philosophical frameworks. Against this background, and more constructively, the article proposes a fundamental distinction between “intravirtual” and “extravirtual” consequences - a distinction that allows us to understand and conceptualize real-time interactions online more accurately. By relating this distinction to Searle's notion of “condition of satisfaction,” the article also shows its implications for judging real-time, online interactions in virtual worlds as irrational and/or immoral. The ultimate purpose is to illustrate how new philosophical concepts and frameworks can allow us to better account for the unique characteristics of the Internet